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IN THE SHADOW OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT:
“OUTSOURCING” THE INVESTIGATION BY
GOVERNMENT COUNSEL TO RELATOR COUNSEL
DURING THE SEAL PERIOD
ROBERT FABRIKANT† AND NKECHINYEM N WABUZOR††

I.

INTRODUCTION

The civil False Claims Act (FCA)1 was enacted during the Civil War to
combat fraudulent sales and other abusive practices by private suppliers to
the Union Army. From the outset, the FCA permitted actions to be brought
either by the attorney general, or a private citizen acting on behalf of the
United States.2 Where a private citizen files a claim under the FCA, it is
termed a qui tam lawsuit.3
In its current form, the FCA requires a private citizen, also known as
the relator, to file an FCA complaint under seal. Most activity in qui tam
cases takes place while the case is under seal, yet there has been little
scholarly review of the practices which predominate while the complaint is
under seal. This short comment addresses only several of the important,
and troublesome, practices which have taken root since Congress enacted
the 1986 amendments to the FCA, which created the seal period mechanism. As demonstrated below, collusive activity by government and qui
tam counsel have subverted the purposes for which Congress created the
seal period. Immediate action by Congress and the courts is necessary to
prevent the seal period from continuing to be used as a sword, not a shield,
by government and qui tam counsel.

†
Mr. Fabrikant is a senior counsel in the Washington, D.C., office of Sidley Austin LLP, and
an Adjunct Professor at Howard University School of Law.
††
Ms. Nwazbuzor is a 2004 graduate of Howard University School of Law and a practicing
lawyer in Washington, D.C.
Many of the practices discussed here are not documented in scholarly or other sources, but
are based on Mr. Fabrikant’s more than twenty-five years of defending qui tam cases.
1. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2003).
2. Id. § 3730 (a) & (b).
3. Qui tam is a term of art that originates from the Latin phrase “‘qui tam pro domino rege
quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur’ which means ‘who pursues this action on our Lord the
King’s behalf as well as his own.’” Rockwell Int’l Corp. v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 1397, 7403
n.2 (2007). Qui tam actions are actions brought on behalf of the government by a private party,
who receives some part of the recovery awarded as compensation for his efforts. United States ex
rel. Fender v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1229 (N.D. Ala. 2000).
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II. STATUTORY FRAMEWORK AND LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Under the FCA, whistleblowers may file a qui tam complaint under
seal alleging that the government has been defrauded by a government
contractor.4 The complaint remains under seal for sixty days (“the seal
period”), during which the government is to determine whether the suit
warrants the government intervening in the action and taking over the suit.5
The government may extend the seal period only by obtaining an order
from a district court judge upon a showing of “good cause.”6
The pertinent legislative history makes crystal clear that the purpose in
providing for a seal period was two-fold: first, to maximize the government’s ability to investigate the allegations in the complaint by keeping
from public view the allegations in the complaint;7 and second, to avoid
compromising a pending criminal investigation.8 It is common knowledge,
however, that government counsel often use the seal period for the purpose
of leveraging a settlement, rather than determining whether to intervene in
the lawsuit. It is also common knowledge that government counsel routinely permit, indeed invite, whistleblower’s counsel to do much of the government’s investigative work during the seal period.9 The latter practice
may fairly be described as a form of “outsourcing.”
This article argues that government counsel’s increasing, and misplaced, reliance on relator’s counsel during the seal period has the reprehensible effect of sapping the government’s ability to meet their professional
responsibility of evaluating the allegations in the complaint in a “fair and
even handed” manner.10 It also argues that “outsourcing” is exacerbated by
attempts by whistleblower’s counsel to be compensated for their work on
behalf of government counsel under the attorneys’ fees provision of the
FCA. Finally, the cumulative effect of these abusive practices is to unduly
prolong the seal period, and to enhance the ability of the government and

4. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(d) (2003).
5. Id. § 3730(b)(2).
6. Id. § 3730(b)(3) (2003).
7. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 24 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5289.
8. Id. at 16, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5281.
9. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health Group, Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d
1323, 1337 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
10. Memorandum from Eric H. Holder, Jr., Deputy Attorney General, Dep’t of Justice, to all
United States Attorneys et. al, Re: Guidance on the Use of the False Claims Act in Civil Health
Matters, June 3, 1998, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/readingroom/chcm.htm (setting out
the manner in which government attorneys are to enforce the FCA in civil health care matters).
This directive was issued in response to concerns that DOJ had acted in an abusive, heavy handed
manner in the healthcare area in applying the FCA. This resulted in the GAO report which
appears in the following footnote.
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relator’s counsel, often acting in consort, to extract unreasonable settlements from defendants.11
III. ABUSIVE PRACTICES BY GOVERNMENT AND QUI TAM
COUNSEL DURING THE SEAL PERIOD
A. EXCESSIVE LENGTH OF THE SEAL PERIOD
The government intervenes in approximately one third of all FCA
cases.12 It is almost always the case that the sixty-day seal period provided
in the FCA is extended, usually by an extraordinarily lengthy amount.
There are no available statistics which show the average/median length of
the seal period. The only systematic review which pertains to the issues at
hand was conducted by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in
2005. The GAO concluded, after reviewing data maintained by the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) for the period 1986 to 2005, that “cases in
which DOJ intervened took a median of 38 months to conclude and ranged
from 4 months to 187 months.”13 This figure does not include cases in
which the government did not intervene. Nevertheless, it provides a reliable indication of the length of the seal period in cases where the underlying
allegations (or other matters which were brought to the government’s attention during the seal period) are sufficiently meritorious to warrant intervention by the government.14
If the median seal period is, indeed, thirty-eight months, then the
median exceeds the statutorily contemplated period of two months, by a
factor of eighteen. This reflects cases in which the government has intervened over a period of nearly twenty years. Given the protracted period
during which this extravagant ballooning of the seal period has occurred, it
11. The Government Accounting Office issued a report in 1999 lamenting abusive practices
by the United States Department of Justice in using the FCA to coerce settlements. U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-99-170, MEDICARE FRAUD AND ABUSE: DOJ’S
IMPLEMENTATION OF FALSE CLAIMS ACT GUIDANCE IN NATIONAL INITIATIVES VARIES 4-5
(1999) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
12. Id. at 29.
13. Letter from Laurie E. Elkstrand, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, GAO, to U.S.
Rep. F. James Sensenbrenner and Rep. Chris Cannon, and Sen. Charles E. Grassley (Jan. 31,
2006) [hereinafter GAO Letter].
14. Id. (emphasis added). The GAO report indicates that cases in which the government
intervened, settled for amounts which significantly exceeded those cases in which the government
declined to intervene. GAO REPORT, supra note 11, at 35. The GAO report indicates that in the
538 cases in which the government intervened from 1987 through 2005 the median settlement
recovery was $1,200,000, whereas the median settlement recovery in non-intervened cases was
$100,000, or less than ten percent of the median settlement in the intervened cases. Id. This
confirms the obvious point that cases in which the government intervenes are more substantial
than the non-intervened cases. Id.
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is fair, indeed long overdue, to ask why it has occurred, and what actually
happens during the seal period?
There is a plethora of data on the amounts of the financial settlements
which occur at the termination of the seal period,15 and somewhat less data
on the length of the seal period. Yet, there is surprisingly little or no data
on what actually happens during the seal period. In particular, there are
very few reported cases describing, or challenging, what transpires during
the seal period. Reported decisions which discuss what occurs during the
seal period do so usually in the context of deciding whether the relator’s
assistance to the government, especially in the form of work done by relator’s counsel, entitles the relator to a greater share of the amount recovered
from the defendant by the government.
Strangely, these court discussions do not occur in the context of deciding whether to award attorneys’ fees and expenses for relator’s counsel’s
assistance during the seal period. As noted below, relator’s counsel seek to
use their rendering assistance to the government as a factor which entitles
their client to a larger share of the government’s recovery, and to argue that
their clients are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees for that very same
assistance. We are aware of no case in which this “double-dipping” has
been challenged.
B. ABUSIVE PRACTICES
Prior to 1986, the FCA limited relators to receiving not more than the
percent of the proceeds recovered in the event the government intervened in
the suit.16 As part of the 1986 amendments to the FCA, however, Congress
increased the cap in cases in which the government intervened from ten
percent to thirty percent.17 The statute provides little insight on how the
relator’s share is to be determined other than to say that it “depend[s] upon
the extent to which the person substantially contributed to the prosecution
of the action.”18 The DOJ has prepared a Relators Share Guidelines
15. For example, the GAO reported, “[F]rom fiscal years 1987 through 2005, settlement and
judgments for the federal government in FCA cases have exceeded $15 billion, of which $9.6
billion, or 64 percent, was for cases filed by whistle blowers under [the] FCA’s qui tam
provisions.” GAO Letter, supra note 13, at 1.
16. This cap was inserted in the 1943 amendments to the FCA. 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1982).
Under the 1943 amendments the relator could recover up to twenty-five percent if the government
failed to intervene.
17. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
18. The legislative history of the Senate bill identifies three factors that ought to bear on the
percentage awarded to the relator: first, the significance of the information provided by the relator
to the government; second, the relator’s contribution to the result; and third, whether the
government was previously aware of the information initially provided by the relator the
government. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 28 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5293.
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(Guidelines), which sets forth a number of factors which it takes into
account in deciding how large the relator’s share of the proceeds should
be.19
These Guidelines have several provisions which bear on the issues at
hand. First, the Guidelines mention “[t]he relator provided substantial assistance during the investigation and pre-trial phase of the case;”20 second,
the “relator’s counsel provided substantial assistance to the government”; 21
and third, the “relator and his counsel supported and cooperated with the
government during the entire proceeding.”22
A case in point is United States ex rel. Alderson v. Quorum Health
Group, Inc.,23 where the court awarded the relator twenty-four percent of
the government’s recovery.24 In Alderson, the court noted that during the
seal period relator’s counsel
predicted [to relator] that DOJ would demand that [relator’s
counsel], on behalf of [the relator] assume primary responsibility
for prosecution of the litigation. . . . [and] further predicted that,
absent [relator’s counsel] assuming the burden of lead plaintiff’s
counsel, the United States would decline to intervene.25
The court further noted that at a pre-intervention meeting, at which the
government lawyers
reiterated their skeptical view of [relator’s case] . . . as anticipated
by [relator’s] counsel, DOJ claimed a scarcity of resources to
undertake protracted litigation against [the defendant]. DOJ
sought and received assurance from [relator’s] counsel of their
ability and willingness to commit the necessary resources to the
case and to undertake the principal role in prosecuting the
litigation . . . [subsequently] pursuant to . . . and in reliance on the
commitment from [relator’s counsel] the United States
intervened.26

19. These Guidelines became available through a Freedom of Information Act request, and
have now become public. See generally 11 FALSE CLAIMS ACT & QUI TAM Q. REV. 17-19
(1997).
20. Dep’t of Justice, Relator’s Share Guidelines 2 (Dec. 1996) (internal memorandum),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/civil/frauds/fcrs/fraudnet/topics/relator’s_share__intervened
.htm (follow Relator’s Share Guidelines hyperlink under DOJ Memoranda).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 171 F. Supp. 2d 1323 (M.D. Fla. 2001).
24. Alderson, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 1338.
25. Id. at 1328.
26. Id. at 1329.
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The court further commented that “much of the work surrounding
the preparation of the United States’ [superseding complaint by
way of intervention] reveals significant cooperation between the
parties. For example, auditors’ reports were appended as exhibits
to the United States’ complaints . . . [during this process,] the
parties undertook the arduous task of identifying and highlighting,
page by page, individual categories of information contained in the
[cost reports which relator contended contained false statements],
individual categories of information contained in the reports. This
task was managed principally by [one of relator’s counsel] who
directed a team of DOJ paralegals.”27
The extraordinary assistance to the government provided by relator’s
counsel during the seal period was a significant factor in awarding relator a
share of the proceeds at the upper range of the statutorily permissible
amount. Alderson did not, however, address the extent to which, if at all,
that very same assistance by relator’s counsel, which counted toward an upward share for the relator, could also be recovered under the attorneys’ fees
provision of the statute. Thus, the court had no occasion to determine
whether it would be a prohibited form of “double dipping” to permit counsel’s conduct to count both in calculating the relator’s percentage share and
also in setting the proper amount for the recovery of attorneys’ fees.
The case of United States ex rel. John Doe I v. Pennsylvania Blue
Shield, Xact Medicare Services, Inc.28 is the only reported case which
remotely comes close to addressing “outsourcing.” In that case, defendants
sought to reduce relator’s attorneys’ fee award on the ground that a portion
of counsel’s hours were redundant, and therefore unnecessary, because they
duplicated time spent by government counsel and their investigators.29 The
court held that it could not reduce the award unless the defendant could,
with specificity, identify the hours which duplicated the government’s
investigatory efforts.30 The court did not address the situation where the
government lays back during the seal period and allows the relator (and
relator’s counsel) to do the government’s investigative work.31
27. Id. at 1330.
28. 54 F. Supp. 2d 410 (M.D. Pa. 1999).
29. Pa. Blue Shield, 54 F. Supp. 2d. at 414-15.
30. Id.
31. The case has been criticized on the ground that “it is clearly improper, and it could
require significant, intrusive discovery into the government investigation.” JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL
FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS 4-244 (3d ed. 2006). This may be so, but it does not
address the more important question whether non-redundant work should be recompensed if it was
work that the legislative history would suggest should be performed by the government, not the
relator, during the seal period.
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The Alderson court’s discussion of the character and quantity of the
assistance rendered to the government during the seal period by relator’s
counsel mirrors our own experience in this area. This assistance consists
broadly of the following:
First, during the seal period, relator’s counsel, at the request of the
government, conducts factual and legal research, drafts and reviews government letters to defense counsel, drafts and reviews internal government
position papers, drafts and reviews government mediation briefs and presentations, participates in interviewing fact witnesses, and, unbeknownst to
the defense, takes over responsibility for paying and preparing the government’s expert witnesses, supplying paralegals and other clerical help to the
government, and reviewing documents produced by defendants (including
documents produced under compulsion). It is sometimes the case that when
the relator takes over contractual responsibility for the expert witness, the
relator enters into a new contract with the expert which calls for the expert
to be reimbursed at a significantly higher amount than called for under the
government’s contract, and the new contract often contains a contingency
feature which did not appear in the government’s contract, and which gives
the expert an impermissible stake in the outcome of the case.
Second, during the seal period, at the request of government counsel,
relator’s counsel conducts settlement negotiations with defense counsel.
These negotiations involve relator’s counsel proposing a settlement dollar
amount to defendants, and the government not only participating with
relator’s counsel in developing what is ostensibly the relator’s settlement
position, but government counsel explicitly endorsing the settlement
offer(s) made by relator’s counsel.
Third, during the seal period, government counsel either makes substantial settlement offers to the defense and/or “recommends” to the defendant that it accept a settlement offer from the relator which calls for a
substantial payment by the defendant. The government prolongs the seal
period, and may conduct additional factual and/or legal research while
settlement negotiations are being conducted with the defendant.
As all of the above unfolds, relator’s counsel often acts, and sees themselves as acting, as “general counsel” to the government. In fact, a highly
regarded relator’s counsel has publicly stated that relator’s counsel should
seek to assume the position of “general counsel” to the government in qui
tam cases.32

32. Mark Raspanti, Current Practices, 71 TEMPLE L. REV. 36, 41 (1998).
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IV. THE ABUSIVE PRACTICES, AKA “OUTSOURCING,” ARE
CONTRARY TO THE FCA
All, or virtually all, of the practices set out above contravene Congress’s two purposes in creating the seal period mechanism: first, to enable
the government to investigate the allegations in the relator’s complaint in
order to determine whether the case warrants government intervention; and
second, to avoid compromising an ongoing criminal investigation (should
one, in fact, exist). While the foregoing, abusive, practices may constitute
“substantial assistance” to the government, and therefore may enable the
relator to obtain an increased share of the proceeds from the suit, the relator
should not be recompensed separately for these practices during the seal
period.
A relator’s recompense for assistance provided by its counsel to the
government is to obtain from the government (and the court) an increase in
its fractional share of the ultimate settlement proceeds. If relators were able
to recover both a higher percentage of the settlement proceeds for assisting
the government and the costs incurred in performing legal and investigative
work on behalf of the government, relators effectively would be awarded a
double recovery. The FCA does not countenance such a windfall for
relators for work done by relator’s counsel during the seal period.
It is arguable that the FCA does contemplate a double recovery for
work done by relator’s counsel before and after, but not during, the seal
period. Prior to the seal period, relator’s counsel has no choice but to expend energy preparing and filing the complaint. After the seal period, if the
government declines to intervene or intervenes sans settlement, relator’s
counsel may have to undertake substantial litigation activities. Such work
by relator’s counsel is entirely conventional, and wholly within the ambit of
the FCA. This cannot be said, however, about work by relator’s counsel
during the seal period.
The legislative history makes clear that the seal period was created for
the benefit of the government, not relators.33 Specifically, the seal period
was created “in response to Justice Department concerns that qui tam
complaints filed in open court [as was the case prior to the 1986 amendments] might tip off targets of ongoing criminal investigations.”34 “Under
this provision, the purposes of qui tam actions are balanced with law
enforcement needs. . . .”35

33. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 16 (1986), as reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 9263.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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The legislative history also makes clear that the onus is on the
government, not the relator, during the seal period. Thus, the Senate Report
states:
Keeping the qui tam complaint under seal for the initial 60-day
period is intended to allow the Government an adequate opportunity to fully evaluate the private enforcement suit and determine
both if that suit involves matters the Government is already
investigating and whether it is in the Government’s interest to
intervene and take over the civil action.36
The Report later mentions that creating the sixty-day seal period
furnishes the “Government an opportunity to study and evaluate the information” provided by the relator.37 As a prominent relator lawyer correctly
put it: “During the period while the complaint remains under seal, the
government is obligated to investigate the allegations and determine
whether to intervene in the action.”38
“Outsourcing” of the type outlined above, does not simply restore the
status quo as it existed before Congress imposed the mechanism of the
“seal period.” Rather, “outsourcing” actually puts the relator in a better
position than before the 1986 Amendments. Prior to the 1986 Amendments, a relator filed a complaint and the lawsuit proceeded like any other
suit. By virtue of “outsourcing” a relator can now hide behind the “seal”
and conduct one-sided discovery against defendants. Thus, through this
improper collaboration, the government and the relator have converted the
seal period primarily for the benefit of relator, and, in so doing, have subverted the purposes for which Congress created the seal period. “Outsourcing” enables the relator to use the seal period as a sword rather than a
shield.
The FCA does not contemplate that the relator and the government
may maintain the seal for an indefinite period while one or both of them
investigate and the government makes its intervention decision. Rather, the
36. Id. at 5289 (emphasis added). According to the leading treatise in the field, the “primary
purpose [for mandating that the complaint be filed initially under seal when it passed the 1986
Amendments] was to allow the government to ascertain privately ‘whether it was already
investigating the claims stated in the suit and then to consider whether it wished to intervene.’”
BOESE, supra note 31, at 4-159 (quoting from Erickson ex rel. United States v. Am. Inst. of
Biological Sciences, 716 F. Supp. 908, 912 (E.D. Va. 1989) (citing S. REP. NO. 99-345 (1986));
United States ex rel. Piiolon v. Martin Marietta Corp., 60 F.3d 995, 998 (2d Cir. 1995)). See, e.g.,
United States ex rel. Made in the U.S.A Found v. Billington, 985 F. Supp. 604, 608 (D. Md. 1997)
(finding the purpose of requiring a relator to file a written disclosure statement along with sealed
complaint is to enable government to properly investigate claims prior to deciding whether to
intervene).
37. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 5289 (emphasis added).
38. Raspanti, supra note 32, at 38.
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statute provides that the sixty-day seal period may be extended, but only for
“good cause.”39 Congress believed that “with the vast majority of cases, 60
days, is an adequate amount of time to permit Government coordination,
review and decision.”40 “Consequently, ‘good cause’ would not be established merely upon a showing that the Government was overburdened and
had not had a chance to address the complaint.”41 The committee’s strong
desire that the government toe the line during the seal period was
dramatically underscored by their statement that it “does not intend that
criminal investigations be considered an automatic bar to proceeding with a
civil fraud suit.”42
When the 1986 Amendments were enacted, the DOJ attorneys in civil
FCA cases “rel[ied] in large part on FBI reports and information gathered
by the various Inspectors General.”43 The government identified two flaws
in the then existing investigatory scheme: first, that the DOJ attorneys did
not have compulsory process available to them after a relator filed a suit (at
that time not under seal) to determine whether to intervene in the relator’s
suit. The second defect related to the civil DOJ attorneys being unable to
obtain information which had been obtained through the grand jury process.44 Congress rectified these inadequacies by granting CID authority to
DOJ during the newly created seal period. If Congress had intended to
allow, or encourage, relators to participate in the government’s seal period
investigation (and supplement the work done by the FBI and the Inspectors
General, through “outsourcing” or otherwise), surely it would have been
explicit, as it was explicit in sweetening the incentives for relators to file
suits under seal. Instead, Congress expressly limited the use of the
expanded investigatory tools to the government.
Congress’s failure to invite or endorse an “outsourcing” approach to
supplement the government’s seal period investigation is significant for the
further reason that Congress was then aware that “perhaps the most serious
problem plaguing effective [FCA] enforcement is a lack of resources on the
part of Federal enforcement agencies.”45 “Outsourcing,” especially of the

39. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(3) (2003).
40. Act of October 6, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, § 2, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. (99 Stat.) 5289-90
(codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3729(e)).
41. Id. (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 5290.
43. Id. at 5271 (omitting footnote reference to testimony of Associate Deputy Attorney
General Jay Stephens).
44. This reflected the holding in United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418
(1983), limiting the access of civil government lawyers to information obtained through the grand
jury process.
45. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 5272 (1986).
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type that occurred here, is, presumably, a response to a lack of government
resources, yet Congress, being then painfully aware of the government’s
reportedly inadequate resources did not invite or endorse “outsourcing.” It
is certainly the case that “outsourcing” would have been a quick fix to the
government’s reported lack of resources, yet Congress moved in a different
direction. It provided the government with additional investigatory tools
which were emphatically not made available to relators. Congress’s failure
to enshrine “outsourcing” is noteworthy in view of the fact that it was aware
that the government’s FCA adversaries were large companies, and that “too
often” the “government’s enforcement team is overmatched by the legal
teams major contractors retain.”46
All of the above makes clear that, during the seal period, it is incumbent upon the government to make an intervention decision and for the
government to conduct the investigation necessary to make that decision.47
If the government is “overburdened” during the seal period, it is precluded
from seeking to extend the seal period for that reason. A fortiori, being
“overburdened” does not provide the government with a legally sufficient
justification for “outsourcing” the investigation during the seal period.
An exceedingly lengthy delay in unsealing the complaint is itself strong
evidence that the government and the relator abused the seal period. This is
especially so if the qui tam complaint did not contain allegations which
touched on a pending criminal investigation.
By prolonging the seal period for the purpose of conducting settlementrelated, one-sided discovery, the government and the relator deliberately,
and wrongly, preclude defendants from exercising their rights as litigants
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This violates the spirit of the
FCA because, as made plain by the legislative history, “by providing for
sealed complaints, [Congress] did not intend to affect defendants’ rights in
anyway.”48 Indeed, “the committee feels that sealing the initial private civil
false claims complaint protects both the Government and the defendant’s
interests without harming those of the relator.”49
Courts have made clear that negotiating settlements does not constitute
“good cause” warranting an extension of the seal period.50 Moreover,

46. Id. at 5273.
47. Elsewhere the committee referred to the seal period as the “the 60-day evaluatory
period.” Id. at 5289.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. United States ex rel. Costa v. Baker & Taylor, Inc., 955 F. Supp. 1188, 1191 (N.D. Cal.
1997) (“[T]he government argues that lifting the seal would interfere with settlement
negotiations. . . . Congress enacted the seal provision to facilitate law enforcement, not to provide
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whenever the government makes a settlement demand, or advises defendants that it has quantified the defendant’s liability to be a six or more
figure number, this can only mean that the government has, at least informally, determined, that the case warrants intervention, or at least had obtained the information they believed they needed to evaluate the matter and
to make a formal intervention decision. The government’s failure to formalize that decision thereafter is inexplicable and not consistent with the
FCA. The government may not keep a complaint under seal after its decision to intervene.51 The government may not “outsource” an investigation
instead of formalizing an intervention decision after it is in a position to
know whether the matter warrants intervention.
Unnecessary and prolonged delays in lifting the seal also impinge upon
the “public’s interest in monitoring” government activity,52 and deprive a
defendant of the right to clear her good name as promptly as possible. It is
for that reason that the legislative history emphatically states: “The government should not, in any way, be allowed to unnecessarily delay lifting of
the seal from the civil complaint or processing of the qui tam litigation.”53
If the government is unable or unwilling to conduct its investigation
expeditiously, the proper course for relators is to move the court to unseal
the complaint, not to do the government’s investigative work for it. That
was precisely the situation in United States ex rel. Costa v. Baker &
Taylor,54 where a relator prevailed on a motion, over the government’s
opposition, to unseal the complaint.55
Even assuming the government may “outsource” a portion of its investigation, the government remains financially responsible for the entirety of
the investigation. A contrary rule would allow the government to shift the
costs of its investigation to the defendant. This is contrary to the FCA

an extra bargaining chip in settlement negotiations.”); United States ex rel. Fender v. Tenet
Healthcare Corp., 105 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1230 (N.D. Ala. 2000).
The legislative history of section (b)(3) also indicates that “once the Government has elected
whether to intervene under paragraph (2), unsealing of the complaint is virtually automatic.
Indeed, if the United States does intervene in a civil FCA case it may no longer petition the court
for an extension of time to hold the case under seal.” Id. (citing United States ex rel. McCoy v.
California Med. Review, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 967, 969, n.1 (N.D. Cal. 1989)) (internal citations
omitted); see also United States ex rel. Lacorte v. Smithkline Beecham Clinical Lab., Inc., No. 970942, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19224, at *1-5 (E.D. La. Nov. 12, 1998) (“[T]his court is reluctant
to grant repeated extensions of time in qui tam actions. . . [T]he statute itself and the
Congressional Record direct this court to unseal the case once the United States has been given an
opportunity to consider intervening. . . .”).
51. McCoy, 715 F. Supp. at 969.
52. Baker & Taylor, 955 F. Supp. at 1191.
53. S. REP. NO. 99-345 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5290.
54. 955 F. Supp. 1188 (N.D. Cal. 1997).
55. Baker & Taylor, 955 F. Supp. at 1192.
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itself, which allows only for certain of relator’s fees, costs and expenses to
be borne by the defendant. In these circumstances, the American Rule regarding attorneys’ fees should govern, and the attorneys’ fees should not be
shifted to the defendant.
A relator may carry on such investigations of a FCA defendant as the
relator may think appropriate, but not all of the fees, costs and expenses of
such investigations are recoverable. The legislative history makes clear that
prior to the time that the complaint is unsealed, the relator “knowing of
government fraud [should] bring that information forward.”56 The relator is
certainly entitled to fees, costs and expenses incurred in “bring[ing] that
information forward.”57 But, after the relator has brought the “information
forward,” the FCA clearly imposes the duty to investigate FCA violations
on the Attorney General.58 The mechanism of the seal period was created
in the 1986 Amendments to enable the government, not the relator, to conduct that investigation. Though the relator may provide further assistance
to the government during the seal period, it is difficult to see how the fees,
costs and expenses of that gratuitous assistance could qualify as having
been “necessarily incurred.”59 This is also consistent with the principle that
“relators are under a duty to minimize their expenses.”60
As one court recently declared:
[A] relator files a complaint under seal and serves that complaint
and a disclosure statement on the DOJ. The Relator is then obligated to remain idle pending resolution of the Government’s investigation and decision whether to intervene.61 The relator takes
over only upon the government’s decision not to intervene and the
court’s lifting of the seal.62
Congress made clear that an important purpose of the 1986 Amendments was “to provide the Government’s law enforcers with more effective
tools.”63 No similar statement of attempting to provide relators “with more
effective tools” is contained in the legislative history. Indeed, Congress in
the 1986 Amendments lived up to its promise—it furnished the government
56. S. REP. NO. 99-345 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266.
57. Id. at 5267.
58. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (2003).
59. Id. § 3730(d)(1).
60. United States ex rel. Abbot-Burdick v. Univ. Med. Assoc., No. 2:96-1676-12, 2002 WL
34236885, at *23 (S.C. Dist. Ct. May 23, 2002) (citation omitted).
61. United States ex rel. Sarmont v. Target Corp., No. 02 C 0815, 2003 WL 22389119 at *3
(N.D. Ill., Oct. 20, 2003) (citing United States ex rel. Khan v. Chicago Housing Authority, No.
01C976, 2002 WL 849801, at *2 (N.D. Ill. 2002)) (emphasis added).
62. Id. at *4.
63. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5161, 5266.
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with new investigatory tools, which, importantly, were denied to relators.
Congress understood that the government and relators do not stand in the
same shoes with respect to FCA proceedings, a distinction the Supreme
Court memorialized several years later.64
The two key investigatory tools which Congress granted to the government were creating the sixty-day seal period (with the option of seeking
extensions of time upon a showing of “good cause”), and authorizing the
government to use compulsory process during the seal period through the
issuance of compulsory investigative demands (CIDs). Significantly, the
CID provisions enacted by Congress precluded the government from sharing information obtained through the use of CIDs with third parties. The
only limited exception was that the Justice Department could share CID
information with other government agencies but only after a court order
was obtained.65 Instead of allowing relators to share in the government’s
new investigatory tools, Congress increased the incentives for relators
“knowing of Government fraud” to bring forward information in the form
of complaint filed under seal. After the relator brings that information forward by filing a complaint under seal, the burden is on the government to
investigate in order to determine whether to intervene.
If a relator chooses “to take a more active role in the litigation,” the
1986 Amendments grant a relator certain rights previously not available to
the relator if the government takes over the litigation.66 In particular,
subsection C(1) provides qui tam plaintiffs “with a more direct role not only
in keeping abreast of the government’s efforts and protecting his financial
stake, but also in acting as a check that the government does not neglect
evidence, cause unduly (sic) delay or drop the false claims case without
legitimate reason.”67 Thus the relator has the right to “be served, upon request,” with copies of all pleadings filed as a well as deposition transcripts,
additionally, the person who brought the action may formally object to any
motions to dismiss or proposed settlements between the government and the
defendant.68

64. See Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States ex rel. Schumer, 520 U.S. 939, 949 (1997) (“As
a class of plaintiff, qui tam relators are different in kind than the Government. They are motivated
primarily by prospects of monetary reward rather than the public good.”).
65. 31 U.S.C. § 3733(a) (2003) (providing that CID materials may not be shared even with
another government agency unless that agency goes through DOJ and obtains a court order). The
committee described this as the “single noteworthy difference from the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act [of
1976, 15 U.S.C. Section 1311-1314, the federal statute providing for CID authority to the
government in the antitrust area].” S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 5299.
66. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 5290.
67. Id. at 5291.
68. Id.
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The 1986 Amendments also permit the relator to take over the suit if
the government has not proceeded with “reasonable diligence” within six
months of intervening in the action.69 The committee stated its belief that,
reasonable diligence should be evaluated in light of the amount of
government investigative and prosecutive activity in relation to the
length of time the government has been aware of the allegations as
well as the magnitude of the alleged fraud. Additionally, courts
should weigh the resources willing to be devoted by both the
government and the individual who brought the action as well as
the relative experience and expertise possessed by each party.
While in most cases the government’s resources will likely appear
to exceed the qui tam plaintiffs resources, the committee recognizes that the often heavy, sporadic workload of government
attorneys may create a situation where a qui tam plaintiff is better
able to conduct the litigation in a timely manner.70
The upshot is that relator is permitted to stand in the government’s shoes at
some point after, not before, the seal is lifted, and only after obtaining court
approval. The necessary inference is that Congress did not envision “outsourcing” prior to the lifting of the seal.
A likely counterargument is that the “outsourcing” does not result in
higher fees, costs and expenses than would have resulted if there had been
no “outsourcing.” But, even if this were true, it is wrong to focus on
whether the improper conduct of the government and the relator resulted in
higher fees, costs and expenses. The key point is that the collusive conduct
was violative of the FCA, and the associated fees, costs and expenses are
simply not recoverable. A party should not be rewarded for their improper
conduct. In any event, under relator’s anticipated theory, an FCA defendant
would pay more fees, costs and expenses than if the government had not
“outsourced” because the government and the relator are attempting to shift
the cost of those items to the defendant, when they should have been borne
by the government. Neither the government nor the relator has a blank
check against an FCA defendant.
V. WHY ABUSIVE PRACTICES OCCUR
All that transpires during the seal period occurs under the judicial radar
screen because extensions of the seal period are procured by ex parte
requests, and the sad history in this area leaves no doubt but that the courts

69. Id.
70. Id.
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perfunctorily grant government requests. The government is generally unable to move quickly during the seal period because it is unable or unwilling to allocate the necessary resources to do so. This resource deficit manifests itself quantitatively and qualitatively.
Government lawyers are paid considerably less and are less willing to
put in the time necessary to lawyer a case than the lawyers representing
large corporate defendants. Moreover, particularly after 9/11, government
budgetary priorities have taken money away from FCA enforcement and
steered it to counter-terrorism areas. For a combination of these reasons,
government lawyers have increasingly looked to relator’s counsel to assist
them in conducting investigations during the seal period. It is against this
backdrop that “outsourcing” emerged.
An important reason that “outsourcing” has not been the subject of a
judicial challenge is that none of the parties to a qui tam case have a strong
interest in having the abusive practices brought to a court’s attention. First,
as noted above, government counsel welcome assistance from relators and
their counsel, and have no interest in exposing to judicial review the
propriety of such assistance. Moreover, though the government has an
institutional interest in expediting recoveries in qui tam cases, budgetary
and other practical constraints tend to cancel out the government’s theoretical desire to expedite settlements and recover money.
Second, relator’s have a strong interest in providing virtually unlimited
assistance to the government during the seal period. The data conclusively
demonstrates that the relator is much better off if the government intervenes. As noted above, where the government does not intervene, and the
relator has to go it alone, the median of settlements in non-intervened cases
is less than ten percent than in intervened cases. Thus, the relator’s strategy
is to provide the government with the maximum amount of assistance as
possible during the seal period in the hope of convincing the government to
intervene. In all but two reported cases, the relator has been willing to
allow the government to take whatever time it desired in order to conduct
its seal period investigation.71 From the relator’s standpoint, the key is
whether the government intervenes, not when the government intervenes
during the seal period.
Third, there are several reasons why qui tam defendants are disinclined
to challenge “outsourcing” or to seek to terminate the seal period. Defendants are deliberately kept in the dark by government and relator counsel
regarding the extent to which the government has solicited and is receiving

71. See text accompanying supra note 49.
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assistance from relator and his counsel. Thus, qui tam defendants do not
have sufficient information with which to challenge “outsourcing.”
Even assuming a qui tam defendant wished to invoke judicial assistance, defendants are often kept in the dark by the government as to where a
case is pending, and as to the identity of the presiding judge. Such conduct
occurs by government counsel in direct contravention of orders issued by
the presiding judge in granting the government permission to make a defendant aware of the case during the seal period in order to conduct discovery
and settlement negotiations. Perhaps most importantly, qui tam defendants,
as a general rule, perceive that it is not in their interest to expedite closure
of the seal period. Closure would likely have the effect of accelerating an
announcement by the government that it is intervening in the case. Such an
announcement, unless coupled with a settlement, would put downward
pressure on the defendant’s share price, and contribute to an unfavorable
picture of the defendant in commercial and capital markets.
VI. CONCLUSION
The federal government has reaped substantial benefits from the
significant assistance it has received from relator counsel during the seal
period, but it does not necessarily follow that such assistance is harmonious
with the FCA and its legislative history. Moreover, there is much reason
for thinking that this assistance has had the effect of enabling relator
counsel to exert excessive influence on their government counterparts. If
“outsourcing” is here to stay, it should be because Congress and the courts
have placed their imprimatur on it, not because it represents a moneymaking enterprise for relators, their lawyers, and DOJ.

